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EVIDENCE RULES AND THE RITUAL
FUNCTIONS OF TRIALS: "SAYING
1'
SOMETHING OF SOMETHING
Mark Cammack*
The function of the courts is largely dramatic,and drama, to be
effective, must not adopt the technique of science.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

If Anglo-American evidence law has first principles, one of them is
that you cannot assess the means without specifying the end. This tenet
is introduced on the first day of the typical law school evidence class as
the solution to the King Solomon puzzle: "You can't decide whether an
item of evidence is relevant without asking 'relevant to what?'" It
resurfaces with character evidence, which is disallowed only when offered to prove "action in conformity therewith."' And the same relativity principle is part of the definition of hearsay: an out-of-court
statement is only "hearsay" when it is offered4 for a particular purpose"to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
This principle, so fundamental to the law of evidence, also applies to
evidence scholarship. Before we can make any judgment about whether
the rules of evidence matter, we must decide what we wish to accomplish
with them. Because evidence law does not embrace its own substantive
ends, the purposes of evidence law must be determined by reference to
the trial which it is designed to regulate. Thus, before we can decide
whether or how the rules of evidence make a difference, we must commit
to some understanding of the function and meaning of the trial.
Most evidence scholarship assumes that the trial is primarily a
search for truth and analyzes the rules of evidence in terms of how effec1. Clifford Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
412, 448 (1973).
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law; B.A., 1979, Brig-
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ham Young University; J.D., 1983, University of Wisconsin. The author is grateful to Anne
Lombard and Jonathan Miller for useful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay.
2. Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combatand the New Deal,47 HARV. L. REV. 913, 931

(1934).
3. FED. R. EviD. 404(a).
4. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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tively they advance that aim. This rationalist tradition5 constitutes the

internal account of the doctrine because it includes the justifications that
actors within the legal system use to explain and interpret the law. An
examination of the character evidence rule from within this tradition

might compare the assumptions about human personality it embodies
with the findings of psychology.'

An analysis of the hearsay principle

would ask whether the rule adequately distinguishes those out-of-court
statements that are reliable from those that are not.7
A lesser competing tradition within the body of evidence scholarship regards the trial as a mechanism for the authoritative resolution of
disputes, rather than as a search for truth. Working from this premise,
scholars have arrived at a different understanding of the rules. When the
purpose of the trial is understood to be dispute resolution, the character

evidence rule exists as much to give the parties a sense of "catharsis" as
to filter out evidence of dubious reliability.' From this perspective, the
hearsay rule can be seen as promoting the stability, rather than the accuracy, of verdicts.9
This Essay presents a third perspective on the trial in order to sug-

gest an alternative understanding of the law of evidence. Rather than
assess the rules of evidence against the background of the trial as a search

for truth or as "society's last line of defense in the indispensable effort to
secure the peaceful settlement of social conflicts,"'" this Essay will look
at how the rules of evidence appear when the trial is viewed as an attempt to "say something." To that end, this Essay will first briefly describe the technique of symbolic interpretation of collective group

behavior. It will illustrate the technique by summarizing one of the best
known and most influential examples of this approach-Clifford Geertz'
5. See William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL
TRULY TRIED 211 (Enid Campbell & Louis Waller eds., 1982).
6. See, eg., Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Characterto Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 505-06 (1991) (finding that assumption in exceptions to Federal
Rules of Evidence that character evidence is probative of conduct disproved by social scientists
in 1970s strongly supported in current psychological literature).
7. See, eg., Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the FederalRules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. Rav. 783, 829-38 (1990)
(assessing whether assertion-centered definition of hearsay in Federal Rules of Evidence reliably captures evidence in which hearsay dangers are present).
8. David P. Leonard, The Use of Characterto Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis
in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. RaV. 1, 2-3 (1986-1987).
9. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1373 (1985) (arguing that many evidentiary rules can be
explained by need to promote public acceptance of verdicts).
10. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & John T. McNaughton, Evidence andInference in the Law, in 87
DAEDALUS 40, 44 (Fall 1958).
AND
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essay Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight." This Essay will then
examine the rules governing proof at trial as a reflection of our ideas
about the nature of law and fact. It will show how enacting those ideas
in the context of the trial tends to invest them with concrete reality,
thereby validating the very assumptions on which the system operates.
II. SYMBOLIC INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTIVE SOCIAL ACTION
Interest in the expressive aspect of organized group behavior is not
new. The name most closely associated with this method is Emile Durkheim, who saw in the rituals of punishment the mechanism by which
society creates and regenerates the shared values that make social life
possible. 2 Traditionally, the symbolic interpretation of collective social
action focused almost exclusively on religious rites.13 The recent trend
toward applying the tools of social anthropology to modern secular societies, together with developments in the sociology of knowledge, have
given rise to an interest in a symbolic interpretation of thoroughly secular public ceremony. This engrafting of the ideas and techniques used in
the study of religious rites onto nonreligious social and political ceremony spawned the concept of nonreligious or secular ritual.
As applied to nonreligious activity, the term ritual is used to mean
4
any symbolic behavior that is socially standardized and repetitive.' Understood in this broad sense, ritual is a universal feature of social life. It
includes diverse events, such as high school football games, political conventions and city council meetings. These secular ceremonies promote
various ends. On one level they are what they purport to be-amusement, candidate selection and city governance. But on another level they
are part of the process by which we make sense of ourselves and our
social world. Through them we tell ourselves who we are and what the
world is like. It is in part through the symbolic expression of ideas in
collective ceremony that the ideas we hold about ourselves come into
existence as social realities. For just as religious rites give concrete reality to unseen mystical and religious beliefs, secular rituals "make visible,
audible, and tangible beliefs, ideas, values, sentiments, and psychological
dispositions that cannot directly be perceived."1" Furthermore, this rit11. Geertz, supra note 1, at 448.
12. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE (Joseph

Ward Swain trans., 1st ed. Free Press 1965) (1915).
13. This emphasis was due in large part to the fact that in the preindustrial societies studied by anthropologists, virtually all collective behavior was religious.
14. DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITIcs AND POWER 9 (1988).
15. VIcToR TURNER, THE FOREST AND THE SYMBOLS:

49-50 (1967).

ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL
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ual depiction of abstract social, legal and political ideas makes them seem
both real and somehow given or inevitable. "Ritual... assert[s] that
what is culturally
created and man-made is as undoubtable as physical
16
reality."t
Through form and formality [ritual] celebrates man-made
meaning, the culturally determinate, the regulated, the named
and the explained. It banishes from consideration the basic
questions raised by the made-upness of culture, its malleability
and alterability. Every ceremony is par excellence a dramatic
statement against indeterminacy in some field of human affairs.
Through order, formality, and repetition it seeks to state that
the cosmos and social world, or some particular small part of
them are orderly and explicable and for the moment fixed."1
A.

Geertz' Study of Balinese Cockfights

The preeminent example of the symbolic interpretation of collective
group behavior is Clifford Geertz' hermeneutic study of Balinese cockfights. On one level, cockfights are about betting on which of two chickens armed with razor-sharp leg spurs will first succeed in hacking the
other to bits. On another level, cockfights are collective efforts to organize and imaginatively actualize Balinese' perceptions about themselves
and their social world.
In Balinese cockfights, according to Geertz, "it is only apparently
cocks that are fighting.... Actually, it is men."'" This identification of
Balinese men with their fighting cocks is complex. On the one hand,
cocks represent the ideal male ego, "ambulant penises" as Geertz puts
it.19 On the other hand, cocks are in fact animals. And for the Balinese,
animals and their own animal nature produce both feelings of revulsion-witness the practice of filing children's teeth so as not to look like
fangs-and supernatural fear, since animals are associated with demons
and the powers of darkness. Thus, "[iun the cockfight, man and beast,
good and evil, ego and id, the creative power of aroused masculinity and
the destructive power of loosened animality fuse in a bloody drama of
hatred, cruelty, violence, and death."2
16. Sally F. Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff, SecularRitual: Forms and Meanings, in SECA WoRgoNG DERNITN OF RITUAL 3, 24 (Sally F. Moore & Barbara G.
Myerhoff eds., 1977).
17. Id. at 16-17.
18. Geertz, supra note 1, at 417.
19. Id. at 432.
20. Id. at 420-21.
ULAR RITUAL:
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As social phenomena, cockfights are highly structured events.21
Just as the cocks are a metaphor for their owners, the structure of the
human performance in these events is a metaphor for Balinese society.
The owners of the opposing cocks and the coalition of supporters betting
on those cocks always coincide with opposing factions in the social structure. Likewise, the betting by nonowners that accompanies every cockfight is done strictly according to factional ailiation. The groups
represented and the category of allies and opponents changes from match
to match. In a fight between representatives of two kin groups, the opposition follows kin group lines, whereas in a fight between owners who
come from different villages, one's allegiance depends on one's village. In
all cases, the pattern of betting reflects larger societal divisions. How one
bets, therefore, is determined by who you are, rather than by your estimation of the likelihood that one or another of the two birds will come
out alive.22
Given the metaphorical significance of the cocks as the alter egos of
their owners, and the metaphorical character of the betting as a microcosm of society, it is readily apparent that the cockfight is not about
either cocks or money. Rather, it "is fundamentally a dramatization of
25
24
status concerns." '23 And in Bali, "[s]tatus is all," or nearly all.
Although an obsession with status permeates all aspects of Balinese
social life, overt expression of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts is
suppressed by an equally obsessive concern with maintaining the appearance of social harmony. 26 In the guise of a fight between chickens, important aspects of everyday experience, such as masculinity, animal
aggression, personal prestige and intergroup rivalry, are given open
21. Id. at 421-23. The cockfight, which takes place in a 50-foot square arena, is regulated
by well-defined rules administered by an umpire. These rules specify virtually everything: the
placement of the leg spurs the cocks use to dispatch their adversaries; the duration of the
round and intermission (measured by the time it takes for a coconut pierced with a small hole
to sink in a pail of water); and the matching and engagement of cocks (based on a complex
variety of factors including color and physical characteristics of the bird, the date of the fight
within the Balinese calendar, and the direction-North, South, East, West-from which the

cocks are engaged). Id.
22. Id. at 437-38.
23. Id. at 437.
24. CLIFFORD GEERTz, NEGARA: THE THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BALI 102 (1980).

25. Geertz, supra note 1, at 447. This obsession with status has its source in Balinese
cosmology, which sees the cosmos as a grand hierarchy, wherein animals and demons are at
the bottom, gods and god-kings are at the top, and ordinary mortals are distributed throughout an elaborate assortment of fixed status ranks in between. This "hierarchy of pride," derived from Polynesian title ranks and Hindu caste, "is the moral backbone of society." Id.
26. Id. at 446-47.
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expression. 27
[T]he cockfight renders ordinary, everyday experience comprehensible by presenting it in terms of acts and objects which
have had their practical consequences removed and been reduced... to the level of sheer appearances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulated and more exactly
perceived. . . .An image, fiction, a model, a metaphor, the
cockfight is a means of expression; its function is neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten them.., but, in a medium
of feathers, blood, crowds, and money, to display them. 28
But cockfights are more than simply an acting out of Balinese ideas
about status. In part through their symbolic expression in cockfights
those ideas come into being, not as ideas, but as descriptions of reality.
Like other symbolic action, "cockfights are not merely reflections of a
preexisting sensibility analogically represented; they are positive agents
in the creation and maintenance of such a sensibility. ' ' 29 Through them
the Balinese simultaneously form their own temperaments and the temper of society, or at least a facet of each. In this way "the inner becomes
outer, and the subjective world picture becomes a social reality." 3
B.

The Trial as Ritual

The significance of Geertz' article is not in what it says about the
substance of Balinese views about status, but as an illustration of the way
formal, symbolic expression of abstract ideas formulates those ideas as
social reality. Just as cockfights are not merely amusement, trials cannot
be completely understood from the perspective of their practical significance alone. Our law courts simply have not become the passionless,
routinized, matter-of-fact institutions that a bureaucratic instrumental
justification suggests. Just as cockfights adhere to formal rules that seem
superfluous to their patent function as entertainment and spectacle, our
judicial procedures are "elaborated with what seem to be digressions, formulae and formalisms,"3 " that are difficult to explain by reference to
their explicit practical purposes alone. And in the same way that cockfights display and give reality to Balinese views about themselves and
27. Id. at 443.

28. Id. at 443-44.
29. Id. at 451.
30. KERTZER, supra note 14, at 9 (quoting H.L.

NIEBURG, CULTURE STORM: POLITICS

AND THE RITUAL ORDER 30 (1973)).

31. Sally F. Moore, Political Meetings and the Simulation of Unanimity: Kilimanjaro
1973, in SECULAR RITUAL: A WORKING DEFINITION OF RITUAL, supra note 16, at 151, 152.
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their social world, trials depict and thereby validate assumptions about
the nature of fact and the authority of law on which the legitimacy of the
practice depends. The process, in effect, proves its own premises.
1. Formal features of the trial
The process by which ceremonial expression gives concrete content
and form to abstract ideas is not easily discerned. One attempt to articulate the process identifies formality as both the dominant means of ritual
expression and the mechanism by which the message embodied in the
ritual behavior is invested with the quality of unquestionable truth.32
Formality, according to this view, is "the magical aspect of a rational
activity. '3 3 It is communication by assertion and display rather than by
demonstration. Because the ideas are asserted as postulated truth, they
cannot be subjected to rational reflection or criticism. They are simply
declared to be so and, by virtue of that declaration, accepted as true.
The efficacy of formalistic ritual expression derives in part from the
extraordinary character of ritual experience. The regularity and repetition that characterizes ritual "sets [it] apart from the ordinary course of
life, lifts it from the realm of everyday practical affairs, and surrounds it
with an aura of enlarged importance., 34 It creates a time and space
which is, if not quite sacred,35 at the very least emotionally charged.
And formalistic expression lends to the ideas embodied in the ritual the
quality of, if not sanctity, at least "unquestionable truthfulness. ' 36 Thus,
the sense of heightened reality that trials and other public rituals produce
has the effect of "bring[ing] the ethical and jural norms of society into
close contact with strong emotional stimuli."3 7 In this way, ritual "con'38
verts the obligatory into the desirable."
If formality and repetition is the hallmark of ritual, the judicial trial
must be counted as among the most decidedly ritualistic institutions of
our society. Few if any features of modern life are as imbued with formality as jury trials. To begin with, the occasion and content of the trial
is determined by formal criteria. To bring a trial into existence one must
recite certain things in certain ways within precisely specified time periods. Failure to conform to these formalities may result in invalidation of
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1971).
37.
38.

Moore & Myerhoff, supra note 16, at 24.
Moore, supra note 31, at 153.
Geertz, supra note 1, at 448.
See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE 20-22 (1959).
Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual, Sanctity and Cybernetics, 73 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 59, 69
TURNER, supra note 15, at 30.
Id.
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the process. Likewise, what the trial is about is formally determined by
the pleadings.
Trials, like other rituals, are distinct from ordinary life both as to
time and place. 39 The duration of the trial is precisely defined according
to formal criteria. Its beginning is marked by the ceremonial swearing of
the jury, and its termination by the ritual recitation of the verdict. While
the trial is in progress, the ordinary rules of conduct are temporarily
suspended in favor of special rules of speech, behavior and demeanor
which have the effect of differentiating the trial from everyday experience. Most important among these rules are the rules of evidence, which
specify the permissible form and content of much of what is said at trial.
Other rules specify when one may stand or sit, where to stand and sit,
when it is permissible to speak, acceptable forms of address, appropriate
display of emotion, status distinctions, and many other less easily defined
aspects of demeanor.
Trials are also separated from common experience by location.
They are conducted in courtrooms specially designed and set aside exclusively for that purpose. These courtrooms, moreover, are often constructed and adorned so as to incite feelings of awe and reverence in
those who enter. Even when the physical appearance of the courtroom
does not itself convey a sense of solemnity, the fact that the space is
committed exclusively to the performance of judgment creates a sense
that what goes on there is both especially serious and somehow connected with fundamental reality.
Trials are characterized by an inner structure and an "absolute and
peculiar order."' The sequence of events during the trial is invariant.
In addition, the participants in trials act within well-defined roles as
judge, juror, attorney, party, witness and spectator. Behavior in these
roles is closely specified and is frequently exaggerated and stylized.4"
Like other rituals,4 2 trials are suffused with secrecy and mystery.
Much of what happens during trial is incomprehensible to lay participants and observers. Though not told why some questions may not be
asked or answered, they are constantly assured that the judge's rulings
are not his or her own, but conform to the irresistible demands of "the
39. JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT
28 (1970) (explaining limitations of time and place fixed on ritual and play),
40. Id. at 29.

IN CULTURE

41. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 65 (2d ed. 1988).

For example, the classic first line in both opening statement and closing argument is "May it
please the Court, counsel and members of the jury." Id.
42. HUIZINGA, supra note 39, at 31.
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Law." The oracular character of the jury ensures that the basis of its
decision remains largely unknown.
In addition, trials display an obsession with exactness that is foreign
to strictly rational types of behavior. Though there is widespread suspicion that lay jurors are incapable of comprehending the lengthy, prolix
charges read to them by the judge, the statement of the law must be
perfect nonetheless. Not only the judge's instructions, but frequently the
questions posed by attorneys and the answers of witnesses must be
phrased in ritually correct language.
The uncertainty of outcome in jury trials, the high stakes involved
and the all-or-nothing nature of most solutions to judicial disputes generate feelings of emotional tension and release. Indeed, as Professor Moore
observed, "[n]o time in a criminal trial, and few in life, are as charged
with tense expectation as the period after the jurors have retired to deliberate upon [the] defendant's fate."'4 3 Civil trials involving large sums of
money or significant issues of principle produce comparable levels of
tension.
2. The construction of independent realms of law and fact
In its most general sense, law is a technique for assigning normative
significance to historical occurrence. It is a way of "describing the world
and what goes on in it in explicitly judgmatical terms."'
Different cultures and different legal systems construct the relation
between law and fact, between the realm of judgment and the realm of
proof, in different ways. The distinctive feature of our system is the representation of law and fact as completely separate. It is assumed that a
world of fact exists out there as part of reality, and that through the use
of perception, memory and rational inference from observed phenomena,
we can arrive at a more or less accurate picture of what it is.
Alongside or above the world of fact is a separate realm of valuation
or law. Because the domain of "is" and "ought" are completely separate,
neither influences the other. On the one hand, the process of determining
what is so must be wholly value free. The facts themselves have no inherent meaning. Thus, the only valuative judgment that can be made
about any statement of fact is that it is either true or false. Indeed, to say
that description is not evaluation is tautologous, since it is precisely the
quality of being only true or false that makes a statement factual. Be43. 8A

JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE q 31.04, at 31-32 (2d

ed. 1985).
44. CLIFFORD GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE AN-

THROPOLOGY 167, 174 (1983).
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cause we posit an independently existing reality, any statement of fact is
necessarily either true or false. To the extent our factfinding procedures
can produce only approximations of reality, it is because the procedures
are imperfect, not because the world of phenomena is indistinct.
Just as questions of meaning do not influence questions of truth, the
question of "what is so" does not affect the content of the law. Legal
decision-making consists of bringing the two worlds together through a
process of matching a found fact with an appropriate legal rule. The
normative judgment that results is legitimate or correct to the extent that
it is based on the true facts and results from the correct application of the
correct legal rule.
The methods we use for determining facts and assigning normative
meanings to particular instances of conduct both rely on and help construct this view of the relationship between fact and value. Our rules of
evidence and procedure depict the world of fact as an objective reality
that exists independently of the process by which it is known. Through
the dramatization of our beliefs about the nature of reality in ritual or
ceremonial fashion, those beliefs take on the quality of postulated truths.
Thus, the very process that certifies the unquestionable truthfulness of
those beliefs then uses the same certified truths as the premises on which
it operates.
The structure of the trial constitutes the most obvious expression of
the views that perception is independent of interpretation and that the
process of ascertaining what is can proceed without regard for what it
means. At trial, proof and judgment are kept completely separate. The
presentation of the evidence from which the jury is to find the facts occurs first. In a distinct phase of the trial, the judge instructs jurors on the
legal categories that they must use to determine the significance of those
facts.
This separation of proof and judgment is emphasized by the judge's
constant admonitions to the jury not to discuss the case or to arrive at
any conclusions before they are instructed on the law. It is also manifest
in the enforced passivity of the jury. Allowing jurors to ask questions
would constitute a tacit admission that they have some idea of what it is
they want to know. The prohibition against juror participation rests on
the assumption that it is possible-indeed, desirable-to determine the
truth about events without any idea about the purpose of the inquiry.
Jurors are supposed to take in data and postpone all interpretation until
the judge presents the criteria for judgment through instructions on the
law.
The use of uninformed jurors as decision makers further reinforces
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the conception of a value-free world of objectively discoverable fact. Insisting that jurors approach the case as a clean slate implies that jurors
could have a point-of-viewless point-of-view. It suggests that it is possible to approach an event entirely without preconceptions and formulate a
picture of reality based entirely on neutral facts.
This belief in the radical dissociation of law and fact is also expressed in the division of functions between the judge and the jury: proof
is the province of the jury, while the judge is the exclusive guardian of
law. The different qualifications of judge and jury correspond with qualitative differences between law and fact. The judge, whose domain is
right and wrong, is a Brahmin, both in social status and as the repository
of moral esoterica accessible only to a scholastic elite. The mysterious
and sacred character of law is reinforced by the ritualistic way it enters
the trial through judicially intoned formulas that are worded in abstruse
language and must be read to the jury with the precision of magic
incantations.
In contrast, the vulgar world of fact is committed to "a fair crosssection of the community" 4 5 represented by the jury and enters the trial
through the common language of ordinary witnesses. The bringing together of law and fact is obscured from view by the secrecy that surrounds jury decision-making and the inscrutable general verdict. This
allows us to continue to believe that law and fact remain apart until forcibly conjoined in a verdict.
The view of factfinding as a value-free process of disinterested evaluation of evidence is also expressed in the rules regarding burden of proof.
These rules structure judicial factfinding as a series of decisions about the
truth or falsity of discrete propositions of fact. The definition of what
propositions or elements must be tested is determined by the substantive
law. Because the fundamental units of decision-making are regarded as
questions of fact, the only judgment that can be imposed is the binary
judgment of true or false. Accordingly, the jury is asked to determine the
truth of these factual propositions by some standard of probability, and it
is only after all the elements are assembled that an evaluative statement
of the meaning of the litigated event emerges.46
The evidentiary rules of admissibility, rationalized in terms of how
45. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
46. This "bottom up" approach conforms to the model of classical, pre-Kuhnian scientific
investigation that conceives knowledge as a product of induction from discrete facts, in contrast to a method based on the assumption that knowledge derives from the dialectical interaction of fact and theory. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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effectively certain evidence advances the search for truth, obviously imply a belief in an ascertainable objective truth to be found. Moreover, the
form of these rules, which seek to filter out evaluation and present the
fact finder with concrete, irreducible sense perception, reflects the view
that phenomena present themselves to the senses directly, unmediated by
our experience or interpretive classificatory scheme. This is shown most
clearly in the rule prohibiting lay witnesses from giving testimony in the
form of opinion.47 Unless the witness is qualified as an expert, the witness must confine him- or herself to presenting concrete facts devoid of
evaluation. The assumption underlying this rule is that perception, if
stripped of distorting influences, is entirely passive. It is possible to simply take in or imprint images of reality uninfluenced by any effort to
make sense of it.
The recognition of an exception to the rule against opinion evidence
for experts4" only reinforces the message that the process of discovering
"what is so" can be neatly separated from the process of determining
"what it means." The requirement that the expert be qualified as such
connotes that evaluation and interpretation are specialized skills. The
requirement that the theoretical foundations for the expert's testimony
meet some standard of acceptance or reliability implies that interpretive
processes can be isolated from the objective process of bare description.
The hearsay rule and the rule requiring that witnesses testify based
on personal knowledge can be seen as emanating from the same desire to
present the jury with unadorned description. Unless the witness is present in court so that any processing of direct sense experience can be identified, the evidence is excluded.4 9
Finally, the rule of universal witness competence 0 implies a belief
that there is one reality that presents itself to everyone equally. Because
perception is a passive process of receiving sense impressions, the nature
of the external reality is not dependent on or influenced by the status,
moral qualities or even the experience of the witness. Everyone experiences the same thing. Difference in view results from either conscious
distortion or misperception. Moreover, the value of the testimony depends entirely on its conformity with reality and not at all on the authority of the source.5 1
47. FED. R. EVID. 701.
48. FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. FED. R. EVID. 802 (hearsay rule); FED R. EvID. 602 (personal knowledge
requirement).
50. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
51. There are surely doubts about the absolute character of law and fact. It was observed
more than 50 years ago that "[t]he time-honored distinction between 'statement of fact' and
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III.

CONCLUSION

It is not, of course, surprising that our rules of evidence and procedure reflect the assumption that law and fact are discrete phenomena.
That distinction is after all the premise for rational legal decision-making. This Essay claims that the rules of evidence and procedure do more
than simply give effect to our assumptions about law and fact; they also
help formulate that distinction as descriptive of reality. Just as the ritual
enactment of the Balinese man's conception of himself in the form of a
cockfight organizes and generates that very conception, the acting out of
our assumptions about the nature of law and fact in the conduct of the
trial constitutes those assumptions as both tangibly real and indisputably
true.
While the ritual character of trials can be overstated, the modem
tendency to require rational justifications for our legal and political institutions more often results in discounting their nonrational aspects than
in exaggerating them. Thurman Arnold, whose insights into the symbolic functions of law and legal institutions are still recognized fifty years
later as important contributions to the symbolic uses of social life generally, said:
The abstract ideals of the law require for their public acceptance symbolic conduct of a very definite pattern by a definite
institution which can be heard and seen. In this way only can
they achieve the dramatic presentation necessary to make them
moving forces in society. Any abstract ideal which is not tied
up with a definite institution or memorialized by particular ceremonies, becomes relegated to the limbo of metaphysics and
has little social consequence. The institutions which throw
about the law that atmosphere of reality and concreteness so
necessary for its acceptance are the court and the law school.
The one produces the ceremonial ritualistic trial; the other produces the theoretical literature which defends the ideal from
attack by absorbing and weaving into its mystical pattern all
the ideas of the critics.5 2
'conclusions of law' is merely one of degree, comparable to the difference between saying: 'I
see an object' and 'I see a sedan.'" Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Factor Justice?, 66 B.U. L.
REv. 487, 492 (1986) (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, "Facts"and "Statements of Facts," 4 U.
CI. L. REv. 233, 244 (1936)). Nonetheless the distinction between law and fact-however
suspect-and the belief that an accurate account of reality can be achieved through the rational evaluation of evidence remain integral parts of our jurisprudence.
52. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 44-45 (1935).
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It would be a mistake to suggest that the rules of evidence are symbols and nothing else. But an account of whether and how the rules of
evidence matter would not be complete without consideration of the way
they operate to support the legitimacy of the practice they also regulate.

